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HINIHUH WAGE RATES AND THE PURE THEORY OF IHTERNATIONAL TRADE*

Richard A. Brecher

IHTRODUCTION

Nost of the pure theory of international trade deals with full
employment economies.

Ily relaxing the usual assumption that the real

wage is perfectly flexible, it is possible to focus upon a situation of
unemployment.

The present paper extends the standard Heckscher-Ohlin type

analysis of an open economy to the case where the real wage of labour is
subject to an exogenously specified floor or minimum.

This floor-

institutionally determined at the same level in all sectors of the economy-
constrains the actual wage to exceed the wage required for full employment,
so that the labour force is partially unemployed.

Once market .forces have

bid the wage down to the mininum level, any of the given labour endowment
not yet utilized forms a pool of unemployed uho are willinr.; to work at the
going (minimum) wage but are unable to get hired.

Producers in the minimum

wage economy hire no more labour from the pool of unemployed than is needed
to satisfy demand and supply in world commodity markets.

Bhagwati ([2],

*This paper is a revision (with some extensions) of material from

Chapters I, II, IV, and VIII (excluding its mathematical appendix) of my Ph.D.
thesis (6].
For their guidance and encouragement of this work, I am deeply indebted
and grateful to Richard E. Caves, chairman of my dissertation committee, and to
Jagdish iJ. Bhagwati and Thomas O. Horst, members of this committee. I also wish
to thank Michael B. Connolly, Richard a. Cooper, John C.H. Fei, Jonathan Goldberg,
James L. HcCabe and Daniel iI. Schydlowsky for comments on all or parts of the
material at various stages of its preparation. Of course, I alone am
responsible for any remaining errors or shortcomings.
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pages 17-22) has descri bed this type of factor -mark et imper fectio
n as
the case where the actual wage is constr ained to be above the optima
l
or shadow wage.

This situat ion must be distin guish ed, as pointe d out

by Bhagi1ati~ from two other cases- -the case of a distor tive wage
differ ential (e.g., Rhagwati and Ramaswami [SJ), and the case in
which
the wap,e diverg es from the margin al produc t of labour in an activi
ty
(e.g., Fei and Ranis [7] and Lewis [14]).
Once the genera l equili brium model is set up~ it is possib le to
examine its compa rative static prope rties for variou s param etric
shifts .
It is well known that a param etric shift will create (befor e full
adjust ment
occurs ) excess demands and suppli es in world commodity marke ts,
and
corres pondin g excess demands and suppli es in domes tic factor marke
ts (as
labour and capita l are reallo cated betwee n sector s of unequ al factor
propo rtions ).

Any excess demand for or supply of labour , that would drive

the real wage up or down in the standa rd full-em ploym ent model,
will instea d

raise or lower the level of home employment in the presen t minimu
m-wage
model , respec tively .

Employment, not the wage rate, now bears the burden

of adjust ing to the intern ationa l equili brium .

Domes tic social welfar e

(in the Pareto sense) is anothe r variab le, like domes tic employ
ment, whose
compa rative static respon se receiv es specia l attent ion below.
It may be helpfu l to relate the presen t treatm ent of real factor

price rigidi ty to three earlie r discus sions, by. Bhaew ati ([2),
the third
of three cases that he analyz es on pages 17-22 ). Haber ler [8],
and Johnso n
[9].

Neithe r Haber ler nor Johnso n specif ies the wage floor exogen ously;

instea d, they both take the initia l level of employment and corres
pondin g

wage as given, treati ng this wage as the minimum.

In the presen t

discus sion, howev er, the minimum is exogen ously given and affect
s
the initia l level of employment.

Bhagw ati exogen ously fixes the actual

wage, rather than the minimum, ruling out both upward and downw
ard flexib ility.
In the presen t discus sion, on the other hand, upward flexib ility
is not
impos sible (since full employment, instea d of the minimum uage,
could be
the bindin g constr aint under certai n condi tions) ; althou gh, in
the most
intere sting case, the home economy always operat es with unemployed
labour
whose presen ce preven ts the equili brium wage from rising above
the floor.
With Haber ler and with Johnso n, rigidi ty applie s in some cases
to factor
prices in genera l; where as, with Bhagw ati and in the presen t analy
sis,
only one factor price at a time is ever less than perfec tly flexib
le.
(Altho ugh only the case of a minimum real wage is consid ered explic
itly
below , the analys is would be simila r in the event of a floor to
the real
return on capita l instea d of the wage.)

Bhagw ati, Haberl er~ and Johnso n

all take world prices as given, wherea s the presen t treatm ent also
considers the case in which the home countr y has monopoly power in
trade.
The two major concer ns of this previo us litera ture on factor -price
rigidi ty
are: to compare free trade with autarc hy, by consid ering the
employment
and welfa re effect s of imposi ng or abolis hing a prohib itive tariff
; and,
to determ ine optima l (i.e., welfar e-max imizin g) comme rcial policy
. The
first of these two issues is re-exa mined , more extens ively and
more gener ally,
in (Part II, Sectio n B=of) the presen t paper which also examin es
the impact
of non-p rohibi tive tariff s (Part IV).

A more detail ed exami nation of the

second of these two issues is one subjec t of a future study (and
may
also be found in Breche r [6], Chapte r IX), althou eh a few comme
nts on
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optima l trade interve ntion are offered below {Part IV).

A brief

summary of other aspects of the presen t paper is contain ed in the followi ng
overal l outline .
The materi al is divided into four parts.

Part I sets up the basic

model of a minimum-wage economy, by derivin g the followi ng three equilib rium
relatio nships :

the transfo rmatio n curve, shown to be composed of linear

segmen ts; the consumption curve, or locus of aggreg ate consumption bundle s;
and the offer curve, shown to have a linear segment.

Part II introdu ces

a conven tional foreign offer curve to determ ine equilib rium in all market s
includi ng the home labour market , and then shows that: 1) a minimum
wage in just one country roay be suffic ient to restric t the l-1age in both
countr ies to the home floor; 2) a move from autarch y to free trade may
decrea se home employment and home welfar e--not the case in the absence
of a minimum wage; and 3} imposing a minimum-wage constr aint in a free
trade situati on may improve home welfar e (despit e a fall in employment),
and may reverse the directi on of trade {in which case welfare decrea ses).
Some comparar.ive static proper ties of the model are explore d in the
final two parts.

A number of the results derived there would not be

reached in the absence of a minimum wage.

Part III shows that a shift in

foreign demand in fa•,our of home export s may reduce home employment and
home welfar e.

In Part IV, which analyz es changes in home tariffs , the

more genera l conclu sions include the followi ng:

1) when a tariff is raised ,

home employment m.::ly decrea se, althoug h an incr~a. se {decrea se) in home
welfar e may accompany a decreas e (incres:i.se) in emp!oyment; 2} when the
home country has monopoly power in ':',::,?ilia, optima l trade interve ntion (in the
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absence of complementary policy) is not necessarily a tariff, but instead
may be a trade subsidy or simply free trade; and 3) lihen it has no
monopoly power in trade, the home country may be worse off with free trade
than with a tariff or a trade subsidy.

The method of comparative statics

used here may be adapted readily for analysis of other parametric shifts
not considered explicitly below, as sho~m by Brecher [6]. 1

I.

DOMESTIC EQUILIBRIUM

This part discusses the equilibrium relationships in the minimum-wage
(home) economy, treatin8 production in Section A, consumption in Section B,
and the offer in Section C.

Determination of the actual equilibrium is

left for the followinp: part uhere the model is completed by introducing
foreign demand.
A.

Production
The transfoniation curve, showing the equilibrium quantities produced

at each commodity-price ratio 1 is derived in this section.

Also illustrated

here is the equilibrium relationship between the product-price ratio and
the level of overall labour employment.

Since the transformation curve

turns out to depend on market relationships and entrepreneurial behaviour,

in addition to technology and the levels of total factor employment, it
is not a conventional production-possibility frontier (which depends only
on technology and total employment levels).
curve" and

11

The terms "transformation

production-possibility frontier" will always be used in these

different ways to distinguish the market equilibrium schedule from the purely
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technical schedule, respectively.
Consider the faoiliar case of a simple econony in Hhich two
.•commodities, one and two, are produced with two homogeneous primary
factors of production, labour and capital.

For each ~ood, the level of

technology is given and production exhibits constant returns to scale.
Producers maximize profits in both in<lustries (and, Hhen deP1and is
introduced in Section n below, consumers maxinize utility), in an environ

ment that is entirely free fro~ externalities.
(to be specified), perfect competition prevails.

Fxcept for the wage floor
It is assumed throughout

that good two is more labour-intensive (i.e., uses a larger labour/capital
ratio) than good one at every co':Dmon factor-price ratio.

la

Labour and

capital are perfectly mobile domestically (though completely immobile
internationally), so that each factor's reward is the sane in both
sectors.

The real Hage of labour may be denoted by

T•T

"1

/p

C::

W

2

where wi (i = 1, 2) is the real wage in terms of commodity i, and equals
the marginal product of labour in industry i because of profit maximization~
and p is the relative price of the second good in terms of the first,
At this point, it is important to decide hou to define the r:ti.nimum
wage.

Consider the following tb:ree separate possibilities, where in each

case some institutiona1

2

arrangement (such as custom, law, or labour

unions) sets and enforces the miniT!mm real 3 wage at the same level in
bcth

4

sectors of the economy.

If the

minimu□ wage is specified in terms

of the second rood, at some particular level denoted by

w2 ,

then the

minimum-war,e constrain t may be written as
w

1

/p =

w

> tv

2 =

• • • (1)

2

Instead, the minimum could be fixed in terms of the first commodity , at
some specific level denoted by

w1 ,

in which case the minimum-wage

constrain t would be

Finally, the minimum uage could be d~fined alternati vely in terms of a
constant -utility combinati on of both goods.

Only the first case, as

expressed by constrain t (1), is treated ex?licitl y in the present paper.
The analysis, however, could easily be extended to the other two cases
(as shovm by Brec:1er [6], Chapter I), and these two cases are summarize d
briefly t,,ithout proof in footnote 19 belm:-1.
The total employment levels of labour and capital are constrain ed to
be less than or equal to fixed factor endow!'lents, with no possibili ty
of internati onal factor ~obility.

The supply of capital is assumed to

be perfectly inelastic at the given endornnen t, so that the total capital
stock is always fully utilized.

In the absence of wage rigidity 9 the

supply of labour (by assumptio n) also uould be perfectly inelastic at
the given endowment.

Given the institutio nally-imp osed wage floor,

however, the effective supply of labour--a lthoueh still perfectly inelastic
(at the given endowment) for any above-miniI!luI!l uage--is now perfectly
elastic at the I!linimum wage (with a maximum supply set by the ~iven
endowment)•· 5 Therefore , there is no assurance that the total labour force

-8will be fully employed. 6

Since labour but not capital can be unemploye d,

any mention of variation s in total employment will always refer only to
labour unless otherwise stated. 7
In FiP,ure 1, T T is the full-emplo yment (conventi onal) productio n
2 1
possibili ty frontier, drawn for the given endowments of labour and
capital.

Because labour may be partially unemployed 7 productio n may take

place at points below T T • It is assumed, initially , that the minimum
2 1
wage (in terms of good two) is fixed at the level defined by the marginal
product of labour (in industry two) at point R on T T • In this case,
2 1
the transform ation curve turns out to be T R
, and now is derived by
2
1
consideri ng output (and employment) equilibriu m at each individua l product

2

2RiT

price ratio.
Let p 0 be the first product-p rice ratio quoted to producers .
p0

,

Given

maximum profits could be made by producing at R (where the budget

2

line for p

0

is tangent to T T ) and paying labour its marginal product
2 1
at R which (as will be recalled) equals the minimum wage. Therefore ,

2

2

R is a possible output equilibriu m, since (given p 0 ) this point satisfies
the (tangency ) condition of profit maximiza tion without violating the

minimum-·wage constrain t.

-,

As will now be shor,m, R is only one of many

possible output equilibri a correspon ding to p 0

2

•

(This indetermi nacy

in productio n will be eliminate d, in general, later in the discussio n
when demand for commodit ies is eventuall y introduce d.)
To find another possible output equilibriu m for p 0

,

consider a

decrease in total employment of labour (with total utilizatio n of capital
held constant at the given endowment) that would shift the productio n-

-8ACommodity Two
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Figure 1

possibility frontier inwards to R Y • Uith the price ratio constant at
2 1
0
p , profits could be maintained at the maximum level (always zero under
constant returns to scale) by shifting production from point R to point A

2

(where the budget line for p

0

is tangent to R Y ). This shift from R
2 1
0
to A, at constant price ratio p , would leave the profit-maxim izing wage

2

unchanged at the minimun level--by application of the well-knovm Samuelson
[18} price relationshi p between the product-pri ce ratio and (relative and
absolute) factor rewards. 8

Since profits could be maximized at A by paying

labour the min.imum wage~ and since unemployed labourers could not try to
regain their lost jobs by bidding the ~-:rage below the floor (as they would
if the wage were perfectly flexible), there would be no pressures at A
drtv1ng the economy away from this point.
output equilibrium for p 0

Therefore 9 A is another possible

•

By similar reasoning 1 production equilibrium (given p 0 ) can occur
(with a wage equal to the minimum) anywhere on the line R R --each of whose

2, A,

points (like R

1) is

or R

21

the point of tangency between a budget line

for p 0 and a production -possibility frontier (T T for R R Y for A, or
2 1
2 1
Y Rj_ for Ri), with each of these frontiers drawn for a different level of
2

21

total labour employment (but always for the given stock of fully-employ ed
capital).

2Ri~

The line R

for price ratio p 0

,

known in trade theory as the Rybczynski line

must be both negatively- sloped and (given that commodity

two is relatively labour-inte nsive) steeper than the budget line for p 0 - o
by application of the Rybczynski Theorem [17].'

Since the real wage is

21~the labour/capital ratio in

constant (at the minimum level) along R R

2Ri

each industry must be constant along R

(by the assumption of constant
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returns to scale)--thereby implying that this line is straight. 10 The
level of total labour employment, and hence the aggregate labour/capital

2Ri

ratio (given full employment of capital), clearly decrease along R
as industry two contracts:

for at the constant factor proportions in e.ach

sector, a shift of resources from the second industry to the first frees
more labour from the labour·•intensiv e former than can be abosrbed by
the capital-intensi ve latter; and the excess labour, unable to bid the
wage below the minimum, flows into the pool of unemployed.
Now suppose that the quoted price ratio falls to any level below
p 0 (say to level p11 ) .

Since the budget line for the new price ratio {p 11 )

is steeper than the production-pos sibility frontier through each point on

2Ri,

R

ccn;tr.odity two is now unprofitable relative to commodity one at any

2Ri·

initial point (say A) on R

Therefore (starting at A)~ resources begin

shifting out of the second industry and into the first.

To re-establish

profitabllity of industry two, and hence profitability of incomplete
specialization (at any pt:iiut on the undrawn Rybczynski line for p")~ the wage
would have to decline in terms of both r,oods to some sub-minimum level-by application of the Stolper-Samuels on Theorem [19] 11--given that the
relative price of the labour-intensiv e good has declined below the level
(p 0 ) associated (under incomplete specialization) with the minimum wage.
Because the wage floor prevents this decline in the real wage, the second
industry and incomplete specialization r.er:1ain unprofitable.

Therefore,

flows of resources must lead to complete specialization in commodity one. 12
Output equilibrium (for p 11 ) occurs at a unique point (like B), which may be
located by imagining the following two-step path of adjustment.

First, it
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is possible to think of the economy as moving (from the initial equilibrium

2Ri,

A) down R

through decreasing levels of employment, eventually achieving

complete specialization at.

hi·

Recall that the wage at n.

1 just

0
the minimum-wage constraint when the price ratio was p

•

satisfied

Thus, since the

price ratio has now fallen beloH p 0 (top"), unemployed labour at

Ri_

could

bid the wage (and marginal product of labour) down proportionately in terms
of the first good without violating the minimum-wage constraint (1) in
terms of the second good.

Dy this process of bidding, employment and output

1 levels

increase above the R

always fully utilized).

(recalling that the given capital stock is

This second step of adjustment takes the economy

rightwards along R T , past Ri_, to the new equilibrium point (Bin the case
11
13
As clearly implied by this reasoning, the further the pri_ce
of p").
ratio falls below p 0

,

and output along RiT •
1

the greater are the equilibrium levels of employment
Sufficiently small values of pare capable of

achieving full employment at T •
1
0
Finally, let the quoted price ratio rise to any level above p (say

to level p 00 ) .

By reversing the reasoning of the previous paragraph, given

2Ri,

any initial poin·t (say A) on R
industry and into the second.

resources begin moving out of the first

Profits could be maintained at the maximum

level by shifting production to the point {C) where the budget line for

2.

the new p (p 00 ) is tangent to T2R

Since the relative price of the labour

intensive good has risen (from p 0 to p 00 ) , the profit-maximizing wage
increases (in terms of both goods) from the minimum level (at A) to some
above-minimum level(~t C)--by application of the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem
[19].

2

Therefore (given p 00 ) , output equilibrium can occur on T2R at the
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tangency point (C) in question·, where maximization of profits does not
violate the minimum-wage constraint.

Furthermore, it is not possible

(given p 00 and its corresponding above-minimum wage) to find another output
equilibrium (additional to C) by reducing the level of employment, since
unemployed labour would not cease trying to bid the (above-minimum) wage
down to the floor.

14

It is possible to imagine the economy adjusting to

equilibrium by first moving (from the initial equilibrium point A) up

2Ri through increasing levels of employment, and then leftwards along
T R (to the new equilibrium point C) through increasing levels of the
2 2
R

real wage.

21

In summary, the entire transformation curve is T2R R T1 , given the
initially chosen minimum wage (defined by the marginal product of labour

2).

at R

In the present context uhere the main focus is on unemployment, the

2

segment T R is not especially interesting, since alonz T2R the economy
2
operates in the well-known full-employment manner ·with the minimum wage

2

not great enough to be a binding constraint.

To concentrate on the less

known cases of unenployment, it is desirable to remove T2R from the

2

transformation curve by respecifying the minimum wage at a sufficiently
higher level.

As the minimum wage is raised, its corresponding p under in

0
complete specialization increases above p (by the Stolper-Samuels on Theorem

[19]), and therefore the associated Rybczynski line shifts leftwards.

Suppose

that the new increased minimum wage corresponds top' and hence to the
Rybczynski line for p', R2R1 .
T T at T .)
2 1
2

15

(The budget lines for p' are flatter than

By previous reasoning, in Figure 2 (which reproduces the

essentials of Figure 1) production equilibrium is noH on R2R1 for p = p',

-12ACommodity Two
(Labour-intensive )
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and on R T for all p < p' (with employm ent and output increasi ng asp
1 1
decreas es). For each p > p' (say p"'), equilibr ium can no longer be
achieved at any profit-m aximizin g point of incompl ete speciali zation
(on the undrawn Rybczyn ski line for p"'), because each such point would
involve both an above-minimum wage (by applica tion of the Stolper 
Samuelso n Theorem [19]) and unemploy ed labour attempti ng to bid this wage
down to the floor (since the undrawn Rybczyn ski line for pm lies left
of R R and hence entirely belm, T2T1 ). Thus, for all p > p', resource s
2 1
shift out of the first industry and into the second (by previous reasonin g)
until the economy is complet ely speciali zed in commodity two at R2 , where
the conditio n of profit maximiz ation is met (in the form of a corner solution
with the budget line for pm flatter than ::>.2Y1 ), and nhere labour's
margina l product in industry two equals the minimum wage (as at all points
on R R ).
2 1

Since labour's equilibr ium wage (and margina l product) cannot

fall in terms of good two, producti on cannot move
above p' .

prises further

The en tire new transfor mation curve is

Raising the minimum uage has not only ruled out incompl ete special ization
at full employm ent, but has also admitted the interest ing possibi lity of
17 Since
unemploy ment under complete special ization in good two (at R2).
R R T lies below T2T1 except at point T1 , there is some unemploy ment at
2 1 1
all points except T1 , so that the minimum-wage constra int (1) is necessa rily
18
To concent rate on cases of unemplo yment,
binding at all points except T1 .
it is assumed througho ut the remaind er of the discussi on, unless stated
otherwi se, that the economy does not operate at T1 .

Also, R R T1 is the
2 1

only transfor mation curve consider ed througho ut the rest of the analysi s.

19
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B.

Consumption

Consider Figure 3, which reproduces the transformation curve rr R T
2 1 1
from Figure 2. For each p (say p') and corresponding point (for example, D)
on the transformation curve, there is a social budget line (drawn through D
with slope -1/p') along which consumption is assumed to occur at the point
(d) where a conventional community indifference curve is tangent to the
budget line.

The locus of all such consumption points is ir r e, and will
2 1

be called the consumption curve.

The sevnents ir , r r and r e correspond
2
2 1
1

respectively to the three segments of the transformation curve R , R R
2
2 1
and R Tl"
1

Assuming that r r is continuous, it must clearly intersect
2 1

R R at least once (although perhaps only at an endpoint), as at point a.
2 1
It is assumed throughout, unless stated otherwise, that neither good is
inferior.

20

Therefore; r r must have a positive slope throughout and
2 1

hence must cut R I\ only once.
2

21

The segments r i and r e are drawn to
2
1

reflect the fact that, when there is complete specialization in production,
a rise in the relative price of the commodity produced must increase the
consumption of the other good (given that the latter is not inferior).
C.

The Offer
For each p (say p') and corresponding production-cum-consumpti.on

combination (e.g., D-cum-d) in Figure 3, there is an offer of exports (Md)
for an equal market value of imports (DM), with this offer represented in
the familiar manner by an offer triangle (dMD).

Placing all such triangles

into Figure 4 (where triangle SJO represents the equal triangle dMD of
Figure 3) gives rise, in the usual way, to the offer curve u A A u .
2 2 1 1
autarchy point O in Figure 4 corresponds to point a in Figure 3.

The

-14ACommodity Two
(Labour-i ntensive)

i

P.'"

0

Commodity One
(Capital- intensive )

Figure 3
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Commodity Tt~o (Labour -intensiv e)
(Home Exports and Foreign Imports]
F

p'
/

/

/

,,.,,1/

Commodity One (Capita l-intens ive)
[Home Exports and Foreign Imports]

I

I

J
Commodity One (Capita l-intens ive)
[Home Imports and Foreign Exports]

Commodity Two (Labour -intensiv e)
[Home Imports and Foreign Exports]

Figure 4

Hoving continuou sly up A A in Figure 4 correspon ds to moving
2 1
continuou sly up R R and r r in Fipure 3, at price ratio pv, through
2 1
2 1
successiv ely greater levels of employment and welfare. Hith continuou s
movements along A u towards u (Figure 4), employment and output are
2 2
2
constant at the R. levels (Figure 3), but the economy moves continuou sly
2

up r i (Figure 3) through successiv ely greater levels of welfare.
2

Moving

continuou sly along A u towards u (Figure 4) correspon ds to continuou sly
1 1
1
rightward movements along R T and r e (Figure 3), through successiv ely
1 1
1
higher levels of employment and welfare. The segments A u and A u
2 2
1 1
{Figure 3) cannot bend back to the ori~in (i.e.~ home imports must not
decrease when their relative price falls)~ since the importabl e is not
inferior.
Although segments A u and A '1 h2.ve been. drmm inelastic , none of
2 2
1 1
the subsequen t analysts would be upset if these segments were instead
dra~m elastic.

(Througho ut this paper; unless otherwise stated~

the

elasticit y of an offer curve is taken to be the price-ela sticity of imports;
and as this elasticit y is greater or less than one, the offer curve is
said to be elastic or inelastic , respectiv ely.)

Since employment (and hence

output) does not respond to product-p rice changes when specializ ation is
complete in good two, the elasticit y of A u equals the elasticit y of the
2 2
conventio nal (constant- employme nt, all-price s-flexibl e) offer curve (drawn
in the usual way for a conventio nal productio n-possibi lity frontier) . But
because employment (and hence output) does respond to commodit y-price
changes when specializ ation is complete in the first good, the elasticit y
of A u exceeds the elasticit y of the conventio nal offer curve by the amount
1 1
of the price-ind uced employment effect on imports.
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II.

IlITERNATIONAL P.QtTILIBRIUH

The opportunity to trade internation ally is represented by a
conventiona l well-behave d foreign offer curve~ such as OF in Figure 4.
World equilibrium occurs at the point--assum ed to be unique--whe re the
forei~n offer curve intersects the home offer curve.

At this point, Sin

Figure 4, domestic as vell as ·world markets are in equilibrium , and the
level of home eMployment is uniquely determined.
Stability of equilibrium in world commodity markets requiree, as usval,
that the foreign price-elast icity of imports and the home price-elast icity
of imports

St.ll!l.

to more than unity.

This condition is clearly met when the

home country is incompletel y spec~~lized , since the home elasticity is then
infinite.

Hhen the home country is completely specialized~ the stability

condition is assumed to hold.

(In fact, the previously assumed uniqueness

of world equilibrium guarantees stability.)

In the home regions of

incomplete specializat ion (A A , excluding A and A ) and complete
2 1
2
1
specializat ion in the first commodity (A u ) , l·1here the elasticity of the
1 1
home offer curve exceeds the elasticity of the conventiona l (constant
employment, all-prices- flexible) home offer curve (recalling the end of
Section C, Part I), the stability condition can be satisfied tYith the
present minimum-wage offer curve even l•1hen not satisfied with the conventiona l
offer curve.
A.

Factor-Pric e Egualizatio n
A (binding) minimum-wage constraint has an interesting , though not

surprisin~, implication for factor-pric e equalizatio n.

If both countries are
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incompletely specializad under free trade (in which case equilibrium must
occur on Al·i in Fie>,ure 4) , and if all other standard assumptions for

factor-price equalization (see Samuelson [18]) are made, then the equilibrium
wage in both countries equals the home ~inimum.

That is, under these

circumstances, a miniMum-wa~e constraint in just one country is sufficient
to restrict the wage in both countries to the home floor.
If• however, the foreign country were then to impose its o't>m (binding)
minimum-wage constraint~ the offer curve of each of the tuo countries would
have the Ricardian shape (like u2A2.1\u ), and. therefore at least one country
1
would be completely specialized--assuming that the two wage floors were not
identical, so that the straip;ht-line se~ments of the two offer curves did

not coincide.

Thus, in this case, the uage uould not be equalized internation

ally, but instead e2ch country's real wa~e uould be given by its

Ol·m

minimum.
B.

Free Trade versus Autarc~y
Recalling (from Section C of :Part I) hm! employment and welfare vary

along the home offer curve? it is a straightforward exercise to compare the

free-trade levels of employment and uelfare l7ith the levels under autarchy.

If free trade leads the home country to export good two, employment
and uelfare both rise above the autarchy levels as the equilibrium offer
moves up OA u from Oto some point like Sin Figure 4.
2 2

(Correspondingly~

in terms of Figure 3, the economy moves from point a, up aR

2

in production

to some point liken, and up ar i in consumption to the corresponding point d.)
2

In the event that free trade leads the home country to export good one,
what happens to employment and i:·relfare depends upon the de~ree of free-trade
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specialization in home production.

If, in this case., home production

re!:1ains incomnletely snecialized, then eT'lplorent and. , 7 elfa.re decline belou
the autarchy levels as the equilibriuM offer moves fror::. 11oint Oto some
lower ?Oint on OA .
1

(Correspondin<?,ly, in Fi~ure 3, tI1e economy moves from

point a dovmwards alon?" aR

1

and ar .)
1

But if, instead, the home country

ends up col"pletely soecialized r-1hile exporting: the first coimnodity, then
employment and/or ~!elfare could (but need not) rise above the autarchy
levels as the equilibriur:-, offer shifts from point O to so~euhere on

Au .
1 1

(Correspondingly, in tern>s of Fif>:ure 3., the economy m.oves from

point a to sor,ie production level on R T

1 1

r e.)
1

and

s01:ie

consu!"'-;1tion level on

In this last case, Felfare can i,mrove even Phen employment decreases-

provided the hoE1.e ter,1s of trade fr1prove sufficiently.

C.

22

Wa?;e--Constrained TI'ree Trade versus na;-r.e-1:;'lexible Free Trade
A (T,inc.ino) mininur1-u-ap;e constraint, imnosecl. in an initia.l ua~e-flexible

free-trade situation of full e~Ployment, will reduce the level of home
employment helm-I the endm-~ent level----exceot in the special case, ruled out

by assu!:1ption (on pai:r,e 13 above)

1

in which the resultinr: ~rage-constrained

equilibrium involves connlete ST)ecialization at point T

1

in Fi~ure 3.

Home

"Welfare, houever, may still increase provided the 1:lome terms of trade

improve sufficiently, as sli.orrn by the follm-rinP- exanmle in Fir_:ure 5 (which
reproduces T?Tl and :--. :", 'I' from F'is:mre 2).
2 1 1

In the absence of the wage

floor~ the equilibrium Horld orice ratio is p 00 , the home country produces
at C, nnd hone consul!lption is at con indifference curve I-I.

Imposing the wage

constraint then raises the equilibrium world price ratio to p 1 (implying
that the home country has !-:ionopoly poner in trar:'!e), and leads the hot'le

'-.

J
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country to produce at G and consume at g on higher indifference curve
II-II.

Restating this proposition in reverse, the removal of a (binding)
minimum-wage constraint may reduce the home free-trade level of welfare
when the home country has monopoly power in trade.

This possibility

of welfare loss through employment expansion, in the event of abolishing
a wage floor, is analytically similar to the familiar case of
immiserizing growth (discussed by Bhagwati [3]).

Furthermore, this

possibility of a deterioration in welfare, as a result of the abolition
of a domestic distortion (due to the minimum-wage constraint) when there
is a continuing foreign distortion (due to monopoly power in trade),
illustrates the general proposition (see J3hagwati [4], Proposition 6,
page 86) that reducing the

11

degree;r of only one of several distortions

will not necessarily increase welfare.
Although the home country exports the second commodity in the foregoing
example of Figure 5, it would not be difficult to construct other
examples in which the imposition of a wage floor increases welfare when
the home country exports the first good.

These latter examples would

imply, as could easily be sho~-m, complete (home) specialization in
commodity one under wage-constrained free trade and (assuming no inferiority
in consumption) an inelastic foreign offer curve.
The imposition of a minimum-wage constraint may reverse the direction
of trade when the home cou!ltry exports the second good under wage-flexible
free trade, as shm-m by the follm-,ing example in Figure 5.

Suppose now

that the home country has no monopoly power in trade, so that the world

price ratio remains consta nt at p 00 (<p').

Before the wage floor is

imposed (given p = p 00 < p'), home produc tion is at C, home consum ption
is at c, and commod ity t~m is the home export .

When the ~-,age constr aint

is imposed (given p = p 00 < p'), home produc tion become s special ized
comple tely in the first good (by the reasoni ng of Part I for the case
of all p < p') at point C', home consum ption shifts to c', and the home
country become s an export er of commod ity one (implyi ng a reversa l in
the directi on of trade).

It could easily be shown that a trade revers al

(caused by imposin g a wage floor) does not require the absence of
monopo ly power in trade, but always implies a decreas e in uelfare .

Furthe r

more, when the home country instead exports the first good under ~-,age
flexibl e free trade, the imposi tion of a wage floor cannot reverse the
directi on of trade (given a well-be haved foreign offer curve) , as could
easily be verifie d.
III.

A SHIFT IN FOREIGN DEMAND

An increas e in foreign import demand may raise or lower the
home

levels of employm ent and uelfar e, with the actual outcom e depend ing
upon
.;.

the degree of specia lizatio n in home produc tion and upon the directi on
of
trade.

The presen t possib ility of welfare deterio ration contra sts with

the necess ary welfar e improve ment in the standar d full-em ployme nt model.
When the home country is incomp letely specia lized, an increas e in
foreign import demand will lower (raise) the home levels of employm ent
and welfare if good tHo (one) is the hone import able, as uill now be
shm-m.

Suppos e that the equilib rium is initial ly at S in Figure 4, and that

the foreign offer curve then shifts out from OF (its initia l positio
n) to
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OF 1 •

At constan t prices (p') and constan t home employt!lent, this shift

in forei?;n denand creates a ~Torl.:~ excess demand for the labour -intens ive
second commodity (repres ented by line seemen t SS 1 ) .

This excess demand

is cleared , at consta nt prices (:0 1), as home produc ers increas e their
export offer (from S to S 1 ) by expand ing outnut of good two (upward s
alonP, R R in Figure 3) uithou t loss of profit.
2 1

As the hor<1e country

moves from S to the ne~; equilib rium S v (and moves corresp onding ly, in
Fieure 3? up

Rl.1

and r r ), the home equilib rium levels of emnloy ment,
2 1

income and welfare all increas e.

On the other hand, when the home

country e>~ports the capita l-inten sive first commodity :i an increas ed foreiP.n
demand for imports creates a t-rorld excess supply of the labour -intens ive
second commodity (at constan t prices and constan t emploYl'lent), and leads
to
a home deterio ration in both employment and TJelfar e.
If the home country is comple tely specia lized, an increas e in foreign
demand for imports aluays imnrove s ~,elfare , and leads to an increas e (no
change) in enploym ent when p-ood two (one) is the home irriport able, as will
now be shm•m.

Hith the home country comple tely specia lized and exporti ng

the first Colll!nodity, an increas e in forei8n ir.,.port demand uill create,
at consta nt prices and consta nt home enploym ent, a r-rorld excess demand
for
good one.

This excess demand is cleared partly by a rise in the relativ e

price of good one, and partly by an increas e in the level of home employm
ent
and output (since now these quanti ties increas e with 1/p), as the home
country moves rizhtua rd alonp,
·uelfar e.

A.

u to a higher level of employment and

1 1

Similar ly~ if the ho-me country exports good t~-10 under comJ?lete

specia lizatio n, an increas ed forei'.';n der1and for imoorts raises welfare

(because of the terms·-of- trade im11rovement), but leaves the level of
employnen t constant (since no~1 this quantity does not vary with p).
It is interestin e that a uorld excess denand for the capital-in tensive
first conmodity leads to a rise in employment under complete specializ ation
in that good, but leads to a fall in employment under incoraplet e
specializ ation. In both cases, output of the capital-in tensive commodity
increases in response to the rise in demamd.

This increased output must,

under complete specializ ation, result from a rise in total employment of
labour~ since there are no resources to be drrum from the (non-oper ating)
labour-·in tensive industry.

Dut when both goods are being produced, the

increase in productio n of the c~pital-i ntensive industry is the result of

drawinr both labour and capital from the labour-in tensive industry.

Some

of this labour released fron the labour-in tensive industry must flou into
the pool of unenploye ~~ since the constant factor proportio ns (along ~ R
2 1
in Figure 3) are unequal bet~1een industrie s.
IV"

TARIFF CHPJJG2S

This part discusses the comparati ve statics of changes in tariffs.
First

9

Section A develops the necessary analytic backgroun d by examining

the implicati ons of tariff changes for the transform ation curve, the
consumpti on curve, and the offer curve.

Then, Section B considers how

changes in tariffs affect resource allocatio n, output levels, overall
employment~ terms of trade? and social welfare.
Since an ad valorem tariff on imports has the same effect as an equal
ad valorem tariff on exports (accordin g to Lerner 1 s Symmetry Theorem [131
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·which may be invo~_,ed under the assumptions made below), the following
analysis applies to both of these trade taxes.

Also, it is unnecessary to

give a separate analysis of trade subsidies (on either imports or exports),
since these may be viewed sinply as negative tariffs.
A.

Production, Consumption, and the Offer
Let the ad valorem tariff be denoted by t, where t > O.

subsidy, -1 < t < 0.)

(For a trade

Then the relationship between the domestic relative

price of good two, still denoted by p, and the world relative price of good
two, now denoted by

,r

(whose value is to be determined by demand and supply

in world commodity markets), may be written generally as
p = rr/(1 + t)

when the home import is commodity one, or
p

=

rr(l

+

t)

when the home import is commodity two.
Since domestic producers and consumers respond directly only to domestic
prices, a tariff does not affect the equilibrium relationship between the
domestic product-price ratio (p) and factor reuards.

Thus, there is no change

in the equilibrium relationship between p on the one hand and the levels of
employment and output on the other.

In other ,·10rds, the transformation curve

is always (with or without a tariff) R R T in Figure 6 (which reproduces
2 1 1
R R T and r r from Fie;ure 3), with each point on R R T always corresponding
2 1
2 1 1
2 1 1
to a unique value of p (which is the same with or without a tariff) and a
unique level of employment (uhich is the same with or without a tariff).
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The home country's budget line through each production point has a
slope of -1/-rr that, given the tariff, diverges from -1/p i:-1hich was the
slope before the tariff.

Assuming that the tariff revenues are redistributed

to consumers as lump-sum transfers (and, in the case of trade subsidies,
that these subsidies are raised from consumers in lump-sum fashion), con
sumption takes place along each budget line at the point where the
indifference curve cuttine; that line has a slope of -1/p'.
consider home production at point D [R1 ] iu Figure 6:

For example,

the corresponding

equilibrium domestic price ratio is p' whether or not there is a tariff,
according to the previous discussion of the transformation curve; in free
trade, the corresponding equilibrium world price ratio would also be -rr' = p',
and consumption ~-1ould be at d [r 1 ]; but given a tariff of rate t, the
0
corresponding equilibrium world price ratio is 1r" = p'(l + t) [7T = p'/(1 + t)]
• t] •
. at dt tr
.
is
an d consumption
1

Thus, when both goods are produced at home,

consumption is always (nith or without a tariff or trade subsidy) restricted
to lie on the Engel curve for p', namely r ri (whose segr:ient r 2r 1 is the

2

free-trade consumption curve for incomplete specialization in production).

23

Consumption for the case of complete specialization in production could be
illustrated similarly.
In Figure 7 (which reproduces
.

inclusive offer curve is

u2A2A1u1

u2t At2oA1t U1t --assuming

from Figure 4), the tariff
that the same tariff is tmposed

on imports (or exports) of both goods, no.. .matter what the direction of
trade.

24

At world price ratio -rr" = p'(l + t), the home offer can be at

any point on OA~; which corresponds in Figure 6 to production along aR 2
and consumption along ar

2, at

domestic price ratio p'.

Similarly, at world

-24A-
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price ratio

1r

0

= p'(l +

t), the home offer can be at any point on OA~; which

corres ponds in Fi~ure 6 to produ ction along aR and consum ption
along ari,
1
at domes tic price ratio p'. The sevnen t A~U~ lies belou A u
2 2 since, with
specia lizatio n compl ete in good two, impos ition of a tariff
reduce s the
offer at every

'IT

accord ing to the follow ing argum ent:

produ ction remain s

consta nt (at the R level in Figure 6); and it is well knovm
in the full
2
employ ment litera ture that, at consta nt outpu t, a tariff reduce
s the offer
at every

Simila rly, A~U~ lies above A u since, with specia lizatio n
1 1
compl ete in good one, impos ition of a tariff reduce s the offer
at every
;r.

accord ing to the folloi:-1ing argum ent:

'IT

as just sho,;-m, even at consta nt output

the tariff would reduce the offer at every 1r; but in additi on,
becaus e the
tariff decrea ses 1/p at each r., output and income fall (as the
economy moves
leftwa rds alons R T in Figure 6), so that the offer declin es
still furthe r
1 1
(in the absenc e of inferi or goods) . (In the case of a trade
subsid y, in
Figure 7:
t t

OA~ would be steepe r than OA ; OA1 would be flatte r than OA ;
2

A U would lie above A u ; and Alt ut would lie belm-, A u ")
2 2
2 2
1
1 1
B.

1

Compa rative Static s
The folloi:-1ing prelim inary comments indica te the nature of the
pro

positi ons to be discus sed.

The signs of the employment respon se and of the

outpu t respon se to a tariff depend upon the relati ve factor
intens ity of the
home impor table, upon the degree of specia lizatio n in home produ
ction (i.e.,
incom plete versus compl ete), and upon wheth er or not the partic
ular situat ion
satisf ies the Metzle r Condi tion (which is the well-k novm condit
ion for the
occurr ence of the Metzle r Parado x in the standa rd full-em ploym
ent model ). 25
A tariff 's effect on welfar e does not neces sarily have the same
sign as the
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tariff's effect on employment.

l·1elfare may deteriorate unless the foreign

offer curve is inelastic, as in the standard full-employment case.

26

When

the home country has monopoly power in trade, optimal trade intervention
(not a first-best solution in the absence o-f complementary policy) is not
necessarily a tariff but may instead be a trade subsidy or simply free
trade, in contrast to the standard full-employment case in which an optimal
tariff is always the first-best commercial policy.

When the home country

has no monopoly pouer in trade, a tariff or a trade subsidy may be superior
to the policy of free trade, even though this possibility would not occur
in the standard full-employment model.

All tariffs are assumed to be

non-prohibitive unless otherwise stated, since the earlier comparison of
free trade and autarcliy (Section B of Part II) takes care of the analysis of

prohibitive tariffs.
i.

Incomplete Specialization

It is assumed in this sub-section that the home country is always
incompletely specialized, both before and after the tariff change.

First consider the case in which the home importable is the capital
intensive first commodity.

In Fi3ure 7, with OF as the foreign offer curve,

the imposition of a tariff shifts the world equilibrium from point S to
point V.

(Having free trade in the initial equilibrium position is

diagramatically convenient, but is not required for any of the following
discussion.)

Although the tariff increase leaves the domestic price ratio

constant at level p', it raises the world price ratio from level,,.,= p'
to

,r"

= p'(l

+ t), representing an improvement in the home country's terms
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of trade.

(Hhenever p ,fa

TI,

the expression "terms of trade" will refer

always to world, not domestic, prices,)
To determine the change in employment, first consider the world excess
demands and supplies that the above tariff chan3e would create at constant
employment and corresponding prices {p' and 'IT 11 )

•

It is ,-Jell known in the

standard full-employment literature that, when the Metzler Condition is
not met, this tariff increase--at constant domestic prices (p'), but
increased world prices ('IT")--will create a world excess demand for the home
(It is this world excess demand for the home

importable (good one).

importable that, in the standard full-employment model, will raise the
domestic relative price of the home importable, and hence increase output
of that good but decrease the real wage--the outcomes associated with the
absence of the Metzler Paradox.)

This Horld excess demand for the home

importable may be represented in Figure 7 by the line segment VN:

where V

is the forei3n offer at uorld prices 'IT"; and N (some point on OAt2 above V)
is the home offer at constant employment, constant domestic prices p', but
increased world prices

'lf

11

•

This excess demand is eliminated, at constant

prices, as the home country moves down OA
moves down R R in Figure 6.
2 1

t

2

from N to V, and correspondingly

These downward movements are achieved, as will

be recalled, by an increase in output of the capital-intensive first
commodity (which is the home importable) and a decrease in employment.
when the Metzler Condition is not m~h·

Thus,

the protective effect of a tariff

is normal (as in the full-employment case), in the sense that output of the
home importable increases; and employment declines.
when the Metzler Condition is met:

By similar reasoning,

the proteciive effect of a tariff is

perverse (as in the full-employment case), in the sense that output of the
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home importabl e decreases or remains constant; and employmen t increases or
remains constant, respectiv ely.
By similar reasoning , the following two propositi ons hold when the labour
intensive second commodity is the home importabl e.

First, as the Metzler

Condition is not met or is met, the tariff will have a normal or perverse
protectiv e effect (as in the full-emplo yment case), and employmen t will
increase or fail to increase (i.e., decrease or re~ain constant) , respectiv ely.
Observe that the employmen t response, for both the normal case and the
perverse case, is now opposite in sign to the response that occurred when
good one was the importabl e.

This differenc e arises because a normal (perverse )

increase (decrease or constancy ) in output of the home importabl e involves
increased (decrease d or constant) employmen t if this importabl e is labour
intensive , but involves decreased (increase d or constant) e8ploymen t if this
importabl e is capital-i ntensive .

Second, as before, raising a tariff improves

the home terms of trade (now by raising 1/rr) and leaves the domestic price
ratio constant (at p').
To examine welfare variation s, first suppose that commodity one is the
home importabl e.

\•Jhen the foreign offer curve is inelastic , a tariff must

always improve home welfare (even though employnen t will decrease unless the
Metzler Condition is met), as will now be shm,m.

Assuming that the foreign

offer curve (OF in Figure 7) is inelastic , the deteriora tion in the foreign
country's equilibriu m terms of trade (from 1/-rr' to 1/rr") must increase both
foreign exports and (because trade is balanced) home imports.

Therefore , the

final equilibriu m (V) must lie east of the initial equilibriu m (S).
at constant home welfare (say indiffere nce level I-I in Figure 6) and

However,
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corresponding prices (p = p 1 and

11
'IT= 11' ) ,

home consumption would remain

constant (at din Figure 6) while home production of importables would
increase (from D to Dt in Figure 6), in which case the home imports would
decrease to some point like M (Figure 7) that lies west of the initial
equilibrium (Sin Figure 7).

Thus, a tariff, at constant home welfare

and corresponding prices, will create a world excess demand for labour-intensiv e
commodity two, represented in Figure 7 by the line segment MV.

Home welfare

must then increase above the initial level as the home country eliminates
this world excess demand at constant prices (by moving from M to Vin Figure 7.
and by moving correspondingly in Figure 6 from Dt and d upwards along Dt R
2
and dri).
When the foreign offer curve is instead elastic (1n which ~ase employment
must decrease since the Metzler Condition cannot be met), the impact of a

tariff on welfare is ambiguous, with a negative employr:ient effect to be
weighed against a positive terms-of-trade effect.

For example, if the elastic

foreign offer curve is OF' (OF") in Figure 7, then at constant home welfare

and corresponding prices, a tariff creates a world excess supply of commodity
two (one), represented by MV' (MV").

In this example, by previous reason-

ing, home welfare decreases (increases) from its initial level as the home
country eliminates this excess demand by moving from M to the equilibrium point
V' (V").

If the foreign offer curve is elastic throughout the relevant range.

it may be impc:tssible to find a tariff that raises welfare above the free-

trade level.

In other words, in some cases,

tariff-restric:: ed trade may

be unambiguously inferior to free trade.

Next, suppose that the home country inports the second commodity (instead
of the first}.

By similar reasoning (i.e., by once again considering the
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world excess de!'1ands and supplies created, at constant home welfare and
corresponding prices, by raising a tariff), the follouing two propositions
hold.

First, welfare deterioration in the event of raising a tariff still

requires an elastic foreisn offer curve, and therefore nm1 implies an
increase in employment (since the Metzler Condition cannot be met when the
foreign offer curve is elastic).

This possibility of a decrease in welfare,

despite an improvement in both home employment and the home terms of trade,
is now illustrated in Figure 6.
terms of trade are l/n°

0

In the initial equilibrium:

the home

(> 1/rr'), implying an initial tariff (since the

initial terms of trade, l/rr 00 , exceed the free--trade terms of trade, 1/rr');
home production is at E; and home consumption is ate,
increase:

After the tariff

the home terms of trade are at an improved level, l/rr 000 ; home

production is at increased-employment level, H; and home consumption is
at a reduced-welfare level, h.

In this example, since the home budget

line (at world prices) is steeper than the transformation curve (R R ),
2 1
an increase in employment upward along the transformation curve has
(ceteris paribus) a negative impact on welfare by decreasing the value of
national income at any given set of world prices.

As a second proposition,

any tariff (trade subsidy) imposed under free trade must nou drive welfare
above (below) the free-trade level.

In other words, tariff-restricted trade

is unambiguously superior to free trade (and to subsidy-expanded trade in
the same direction as free trade).

This proposition and the previous one

together imply that a tariff increase may reduce welfare only if the initial
equilibrium is tariff-restricted.
On the basis of the foregoing results, a few comments are now offered
on optimal trade intervention--assuming both the absence of complementary
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commercial policy and the maintenance of incomplete specialization {ignoring
the possibility that the home country might do even better by using trade
policy to achieve complete specialization).

In the first place, optimal

trade intervention is not by itself a first-best policy, since the latter
requires DRS = DRT • FRT (see Bhagwati and Ramaswami [S]) while the former
leaves DRS< DRT:

where DRS is the domestic rate of substitution {in con

sumption), given by (minus) the slope of the community indifference curve
(Figure 6), and equals the constant 1/p' in equilibrium as will be recalled;
DRT is the domestic rate of transformation (in production), given by (minus)
the constant slope of R R (Figure 6), and exceeds 1/p' {=DRS) as will be
2 1
recalled; and FRT is the foreign rate of transformation {through trade),
given by the slope of the foreign offer curve (Figure 7).

More

specifically, optimal trade intervention occurs at the point on the foreign
offer curve where DRS< DRT = FRT, as sho~m by Brecher ([6], Chapter IX where,
by use of the well-knm,m Baldwin [1] technique, the optimal trade policy
is derived and placed in a welfare ranking along with alternative policy
packages).

Since (as will be recalled) raising a tariff always improves

home welfare when the foreign offer curve is inelastic, the latter must
be elastic at the point of optimal trade·intervention.

Uhen the home

country imports the first commodity under free trade, optimal trade
intervention could require a trade subsidy (or simply free trade) rather
than a tariff, since (as will be recalled) tariff-restricted trade in
some cases may be unambiguously inferior to free trade.

(The case of an

optimal trade subsidy and the case of an optimal tariff are both
illustrated by Brecher [6], Chapter IX.)

But when the home country imports
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t~e second comi:n.o(lity under free trade, optinal trade intervention always
requires a tariff (nerhans a :,roM.hitive one in cor:.birrn.tion Trith a trade
subsidy to reverse the direction of trade:. as sho,:.m by :".recher [6] in Chapter
IX)~ since (as uill be recalled) tariff-restricted trade is "llPays
unambi~uously superior to free trade (and to subsidy-expanded trade in
the same direction as free trade).
If, by coincidence, the forei~n offer curve is perfectly elastic at
price ratio

1r'

=

p', then a.ny home tariff is prohibitive,

27

since the

tariff-inclusive offer curve (U~A~()A~U~ in Figure 7) Pill in this case
•
1
.
f oreio;n
.
u . 28
po i nt (•")
autarc:1y
o:i::,.f er curve on1 y at t11e
i ntersect tne

Recallinp; the earlier coT":parison of free trade uith autarchy (Section B of
Part II), a tariff will (1ecrease or increase e,,1ployri_ent and ,relfare as the
home country imports o:ood one or p.-ooc! trro under free trade, respectively.
This nossibil:l.ty of nelfare iJT>provement does not exist in the standard
full-e;n.nloyr,.ent Radel, in which (as a ~·rell-·lmmm pronosition) the optimum
tariff is zero ,•rhen the horn.e country has no monopoly nouer in trade.

ii.

CoT1.plete Soecialization

'"'!hen the home country 11roduces only co"lmoc1ity tuo? both before and
after the tariff increase, equilibriun in Fi~ure 7 occurs first on A2u2
and then on A~U~. Drawino: in the foreign offer curve (not shmm) r-muld
indicate an i"'lprovement in the home tert"'.S of trade.
hm•rever, are constant at the 11

2

E1111:,loyment and output,

level (Fio:ure 6), accordin8 to the earlier

discussed relationshi11 betFeen the offer curve and t'he transformation curve.
The welfare propositions of the standard full-enployment case clearly carry
over to the present constant-employment case.
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When the home country produces only good one, both before and after
the tariff increase, equilibrium in Figure 7 is first along A u and then
1 1
t t
along A u . Drawing in the foreign offer curve (not shown) would indicate
1 1
an improvement in the home terms of trade.

By earlier reasoning (i.e., by

again considering the world excess demands and supplies created by a tariff
increase, at constant employment and correspondi ng prices):

uhen the

Metzler Condition is not met, a tariff will raise the domestic relative
price of the home inportable (as in the standard full-employm ent model), and
reduce employment (since this variable nm-1 decreases when p rises); but when
the Metzler Condition is met, a tariff will fail to raise (i.e., decrease
or not change) the domestic relative price of the home importable (as in
the standard full-employm ent model), and will fail to reduce employment.
Observe that the si~n of the employment response nou differs from what it
was under incomplete specializat ion with good two as the importable; i.e.,
under incomplete specializat ion, employment increased when the Metzler
Condition was not met, and failed to increase otheruise.
The following two welfare proposition s, for the case of complete
specializat ion in good one, follow from previous reasoning (i.e., from again
considering the world excess demands and supplies created by a tariff
increase, at constant welfare and correspondi ng prices). 29

First, a tariff

increase improves welfare if the foreign offer curve is inelastic,

even when employment falls.

Second, if the foreign offer curve is elastic

(in which case employment declines since the Metzler Condition cannot be
met), a tariff increase may reduce welfare by decreasing employment
sufficientl y to outweigh the positive terms-of-tra de effect.

hen ho!ne specia lizatio n is conple te in ?;oorl one and the foreig
n

11

offer curve is ·.,erfe ctly elasti c, a tariff increa se uill raise
p and
theref ore reduce e:rnploy:nent (since 1/p and eMr,loyment decrea
se top;et her),
movincr. the economy leftwa rds alonP- ~ '."'.' in Ii'iP-ure 6. In this
case, a
1 1
tariff will clearl y reduce uelfar e since there is no terms- of--tra
de
i~prov e:rnent to counte r the fall in emnloyP1ent and outpu t.

On the other

hani!, a trade subsid y will raise em!)loyr.nent and mav raise uelfar
e if the
consu1:1ption distor tion (due to a diver~ ence betr-reen n and ,r)
does not
outwei gh the enploy rnent gain. 30 The case of a prohib itive tariff
is an
excep tion to the propo sition that a tariff neces sarily reduce
s uelfar e
when world nrices are given, since (as nill be recall ed fron
Sectio n B of
?art II) autarc hy may be suneri or to free trade, 31 Thus, •:rhen
the hoMe
countr y has ToonoT)oly pm,er in tra(~e, a zero trade tax is
not neces sarily

optir.-1al-· ·in contra st to the standa rd full-e!"'nloyT"lent case in
which, as

a well-k nm-m '!_)ropositnon, free trade is the first- best policy .
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FOOTNOTES

1

Brech er's [6] discus sion includ es: a descri ption of the genera
l
method , in Chapte r III and its mathe matica l append ix; the efecct
s of an
increa se in the stock of capita l, in Chapte r V and its mathe
matica l
append ix; the impact of a techni cal change in either indus try,
in Chapte rs
VI and VII and their mathe matica l appen dices; and the effect
s of tax-cu m
subsid ies on produ ction and on factor use, in Chapt er IX in
the contex t of
optima l comme rcial policy .
laintro ducing factor -inten sity revers als would simply compl icate
the
expos ition, withou t adding much insigh t in the presen t contex
t.
2

To avoid welfar e compl ication s of "volun tary 1' unemp loymen t in
which an indivi dual is out of work becaus e he values an hour
of leisur e
more than the going uage, it is assume d that the wa3e floor
is set
institu tional ly--an d not set by indivi dual prefer ences concer
ning leisur e
and income .
3

As Johnso n [9] has pointe d out, a wage that is rigid in money
terms
but not in real terms need not lead to unemp loymen t in the standa
rd barter
model of intern ationa l trade.
4
A minimum real Hage impose d in only one sector would not lead
to
("open ") unemp loymen t (of the type discus sed here) but, as sho~m
by
Johnso n [10], could instea d result in ineffi cient produ ction
(at points
not on the conve ntiona l contra ct curve) .
5

Recall footno te 2.

6
The unemp loyed labour may be though t of as a pool, into which
labour
flows at any sub-mi nimum wage, and out of which labour flows
(attem pting to
bid down the marke t wage) at any above-minimum wage. Seen in
this way, the
presen t situat ion is analy tically simila r to Mund ell's ([16],
Chapte r 6) case
of intern ationa l factor mobil ity (when the latter is modif ied
so that labou r,
not capita l, is the intern ationa lly mobile factor ). In Munde
ll's case, the
minimum (and maximum) home wage is given by the wage availa ble
abroad , and
the foreig n labour marke t is a pool to or from which labour
flows as the home
wage falls below or rises above the foreig n wage, respec tively
. There are,
howev er, two impor tant differ ences . First, in Munde ll 1 s case,
the flows of
labour to and from the pool shift the foreig n offer curve; uherea
s, in the
presen t model, labour flows are purely domes tic and leave foreig
n
demand
unaffe cted. Second , in Munde ll 1 s case, a flow of labour to
the pool means
merely a change in the locati on of employ ment; ~-Jhereas, in the
presen t model ,
a flou of labour to the pool means unemp loymen t.
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7
Bhagwati [2] discusses variations in the overall employment level
of capital, not labour. Assuming that he actually has in mind a rigid
return to capital and a perfectly flexible wage--not the rigid wage and
perfectly flexible return to capital that he in fact assumes--his results
and the corresponding present results (reported mainly in Section B of
Part II) are in basic agreement, making obvious allowance for the fact
that the rigid factor reward is then different in each case.
8

According to this price relationship: under incomplete specialization
there is a one-to-one correspondence, independent of total employment levels,
between the product-price ratio and (relative and absolute) factor rewards.
9

According to this theorem: under incomplete specialization a
decrease in total labour employment, at constant relative product prices
and constant total utilization of capital, will decrease output of the
labour-intensive good and increase output of the capital-intensive good.

10
Proof that the Rybczynski line is straight may be found in Mundell
([16], Chapter 6, page 93, for the analogous case where 1-otal capital is
varied with total labour constant), and in Brecher ( [ ;:; J, Chapter I, footnote 5) ,
11

According to this theorem: under ineomplete specialization a fall
in the relative price of a commodity louers the reward (in terms of both
goods) of the factor used intensively in that commodity, anf raises the
other factor's reward (in terms of both goods).

12

The impossibility of complete specialization in commodity two may
also be seen geometrically as an immediate consequence of the following
proposition (to be proven momentarily): the budget line fo~ any p < p 0
(say p") is steeper than the production-possibi.lity frontier at each
point on OTz, thereby indicating that profits cannot be maximized wheri
only good two is produced. This proposition is clearly true at T2. There
fore, it is also true at all other points on OT 2 , since (by a well-knovm
corollary of the Rybczynski Theorem [17] the production-possibility fron
tier becomes flatter along every ray from the origin (including the vertical
axis) as total labour employment is decreased (holding total utEizaticn of
C:lpital cons~t).
13

Point B must lie to the left of the lower endpoint of the undrawn
Rybczynski line for p", since at this endpoint (as at all points on this
line) the profit-maximizing wage is sub-minimal. (Rybczynski lines for
different values of p cannot intersect, as explained in footnote 15 below,
so that the undrawn Rybczynski line for p" must lie completely to the right
of R2F1). Furthermore, point B satisfies the (corner) condition of profit
maximization, as could be shown easily by reasoning similar to footncte 12.
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14Also, the
economy cannot specialize completely in the first commodity
at the point on OT1 where labour's wage (and marginal product) equals the
minimum, since the (corner) condition of profit maximization cannot be met
at this point as could be shown easily by reasoning similar to footnote 12.
15

Rybczynski lines for different prod1Jct-price ratios cannot intersect
(as implied by Figure 1), since any point of intersection would have to lie
on two intersecting production-pos sibility frontiers--a contradiction,
because varying total labour employment (with total utilization of capital
held constant) yields only non-intersectin g production-pos sibility frontiers.

16

For an independent discussion of the transformation curve (with the
minimum wage specified in terms of one good), in a somewhat different
context, see Lefeber [12].

17

There are other ways of deleting a full-employment segment like TzR~
from the transfor:nation curve. For example, this deletion would be
achieved (while holding the minimum wage constant at the Rz level) if the
labour endowment were increased sufficiently, so that the new full
employment production-pos sibility frontier (not shown) lay entirely above
R R extended to the vertical axis. The deletion could also be achieved
by a sufficient decrease in the stock of capital. In general, the full
employment (conventional) production-pos sibility frontier lies entirely
above the Rybczynski line for the minimum wage i f and only i f industry
two's labour/capital employment ratio along this Rybczynski line is less
than the given labour/capital endowment ratio.

21

18Th

·
·
· t T1, tis
h" si"tuation
.
ere f ore, ignoring
.
poin
is
ana 1y t·ica11y
equivalent to Bhagwati's [2] case in which the actual (not the minimum)
wage is fixed in tenns of one good.

19

The minimum wage could be respecified in terms of good one (instead
of good two), say (for diagrammatic convenience only) at the level defined
by the first industry's marginal product of labour along R2R . In this
1
case, the transformation curve would oe TzR2R1: RzR1 for p = p'; TzRz for
all p > p', with employment and output increasing asp rises; and R
1
for all p < p' •
Alternatively, the minimum wage could be respecified in terms of a
constant-utilit y combination of both goods, as defined by an institutionally
chosen indifference curve. In this case, there would be exactly one p and
associated Rybczynsld line, say (for diagrami.'1atic convenience only) p' and
RzR1, whose corresponding profit-maximizi ng wage just satisfied the
minimum-utility constraint--i. e., given p' and the correspo.nding profit
maximizing wage, the labourer's budget line would be tangent to the minimum
indifference curve. Then, the transformation curve would be T R R T , combining
2 2 1 1
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the features of the other two m1.m.mum-wage specifications. Each point on
R2T2 (R1T1 excluding poiat R1 ) would in general correspond to a higher
(lower) p than if the minimum wage were specified in terms of good one (two)-
although this price difference might disappear if the minimum indifference
curve were a straight line.
To take account of these changes in the transformation curve that
would result from respecifying the minimum wage in terms of good one or
a constant-utuil ity combination of both goods, the following analysis could
easily be modified (as shown by Brecher [6]).
20

rnferiority can lead to problems of multiple equilibria and instability
in only the following two cases: sufficiently strong inferiority of the
capital-intensi ve first commodity under incomplete specialization in
production, leadins to multiple equilibria and instability for the level
of home employment, but not for world offers; and sufficiently strong in
feriority of the home importable under complete specialization in production,
leading to multiple equilibria and instability in world commodity markets
and in the home labour market. Some further comments on this point may be
found in Brecher ([6], footnote 14 of Chapter I, and footnote 19 of Chapter II).
21
two.

Multiple intersections would not result from inferiority of commodity

22

Bhagwati [2]~ Haberler [8] and Johnson [9] have also demonstrated
ambiguity in the comparison of free trade with autarchy--for the case
where world prices are given, so that (assuming the free-trade and home
autarchic price ratios are not equal) free trade leads to complete speciali
zation (when there is no domestic immobility of factors).
23

For any trade tax (subsidy) of rate t > 0 (O > t > -1), all possible
consumption equilibria on rzri lie above (below) point r (r2), since the
1
world-price budget line through point R (Rz) is steeper undeT a trade tax
1
(subsidy) than under free trade.
24

u the tariff were imposed only on imports of good one (two), or only
on exports of good two (one), then the tariff-inclusiv e offer curve would be
t t
t t
U2AzOA1U1 (UzAzOAlUl).
25

In the standard full-employment literature, the Metzler Paradox [15] is
the case in which raising a tariff lowers or leaves constant the domestic
relative price of the home importable, so that (under incomplete specialization)
the tariff's protective effect is perverse (in the sense that output of the
home importable decreases or is constant respectively). A general statement
of the Metzler Condition, satisfaction of which ensures the Metzler Paradox
(assuming stability in world commodity markets), may be found (for the case
of "small" tariff changes) in Kemp ([11], condition (4.4), page 96). It
suffices here to say that, for the Metzler Condition to hold (and hence for
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the rretzler 1"aradox to occur in the standard full-ernp loy:nent case), an
inelasti c forei!"n offer curve is necessa ry (a.ssuminp no inferio rity in
home consump tion) but is not sufficie nt.

26
T::xceptions to this proposi tion in the standard full-emr ,loyment model
are ruled out by the present assumpt ion that neither ~ood is inferior . For
these exceptio ns when the home exporta ble is inferior ,, see T~eI!lp ( [11], pages
306-310 ).
27

The prohibi tive nature of a hoce tariff in the present oinimum-wage model
is analytic ally siP1ilar to a tariff's prohibi tive effect in rtundell Is ((16),
Chapter 6) model of internat ional factor mobility . In '.Jundell 's case,
equilibr ium require s that the domestic product• ··price ratio be the same in both
countrie s (in order to equalize factor rewards internat ionally) --impos sible
under tariff-r estricte d trade. In the present minimum-wage case,, equilibr ium
requires only that p = p' in the home country (so that the profit-m aximizin g
wage equals the mininu~ and labour ceases to flow to or from the pool of
unemplo yed)--im possible under tariff-r estricte d trade if the foreipn offer
curve is infinite ly elastic at n' = p', but possible if the foreign offer
curve is less than infinite ly elastic.
28 rf the
assumpt ion of. footnote 24 were Made, a tariff could reverse the
directio n of trade instead of leadinz to autarchy ; althoueh the followin g
employment and uelfare conclusi ons ,:;rould still hold.
29
Things are nou slip:htly more complic ated, ·since the value of p corresponding
to a given level of r-relfare increase s as the tariff is raised, as could
easily be verified .
30A ereat
enouP;h trade subsidy will achieve full-emr ,loyment product ion
at point T1 in Figure 6. Inciden tally 1 T can also be reached by a pro
duction tax-cum -subsidy in .favour of__ good1 one and 1 since no consump tion
distorti on occurs, this policy is superio r to the trade subsidy that also
leads to T1 • Furtherm ore (as shm-m by Erecher [6] ~ Chapter IX), the pro
duction tax-cum -subsidy may even be a first-be st policy.
31Bhap:r-1a
ti's [2] demonst ration that a tariff may improve welfare is an
example of the case of a tariff which leads to autarchy . A tax-cum -subsidy
in product ion that also lead$ to autarchy is no better than a prohibi tive
tariff, since the usual added consump tion distorti on of a tariff does not
apply in autarchy .
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